Indépendance Des Banques Centrales Et Politiques Monétaires Non Conventionnelles : Investigation Empirique Lors De La Crise Financière 2008

The aim of the article is to examine the relationship between the degree of central bank independence and the use of unconventional monetary instruments, during economic crises. To avoid the heterogeneity problem, a sample of eighteen central banks is divided into three groups differentiated by the value of independence degree (G5 countries, emerging and developing countries). We test this relationship during the period 2006-2013 in which occurred both financial and sovereign debt crises. The econometric tool used is based on the estimations of a panel data model. Our results show that the central bank independence reduces the probability of using exceptional instruments in G5 countries, except for the balance/GDP instrument characterized by high and positive coefficients. The monetary policy makers have to sacrifice their reputation in order to adopt emergency measures. Concerning emerging countries, they renounce to any substantial expansion of the balance sheet and the monetary base, against part to preserve their autonomy. This is justified by negative coefficients registered at the level of these two instruments. Because of their less developed financial markets, the monetary independence in developing countries is the result of requests from institutions or international investors and it is sacrificed due to political pressures. This result is more confirmed by negative coefficients of the monetary independence index in the different scenarios proposed in this article.